Users of Web content management systems (WCMSs) lack expert knowledge of the technology itself, let alone its security issues. Complicating this, WCMS vulnerabilities are attractive targets for attackers, leaving the applications and their nonexpert users open to exploitation.

Among CMSs, we distinguish between those focused on the Web and the enterprise. Historically, the content management concept originated from organizations’ efforts to manage Web content. The enterprise content management (ECM) concept reaches beyond Web content management, however, addressing management of "the convergence of all front-end applications and devices with back-end document/file management systems and databases." ECM involves not only technical systems, but also "the strategies, tools, processes and skills an organization needs to manage its information assets over their lifecycle."3

In contrast, according to current understanding, a WCMS supports creating and publishing content structured in Web formats, such as HTML, XHTML, XML, and PDF. A WCMS also lets users review, approve, and archive content, and (sometimes) offers version control.4 Using such functions, users can implement an editorial process that comprises several roles with varying privileges, including authors, reviewers, and consumers.

An organization might, for example, use a WCMS to build corporate Web sites, online shops, or community portals. The major advantage of a WCMS is that it lets site creators modify content without having to edit code or possess other specialized knowledge. Organizations typically store the content in databases and publish, modify, and remove it using graphical user interfaces.

A WCMS can be divided by front- and back-end functionality. The front end presents available content...
to consumers, who typically don’t have permission to change or edit the content. However, front-end users are sometimes granted special permissions, such as to submit comments on articles.

Publishing and editing is done via the application’s back end, which is the workplace for authors and reviewers. Authors typically enter their content using a rich text editor, which creates HTML, XHTML, or XML markup. They render this markup by applying style sheets—such as CSS or XSL—which authors can adapt to suit their design needs.

**WCMS Security**

In software systems, security vulnerabilities are defects at either the design or implementation level. Gary McGraw defines a bug as an implementation-level software problem and a flaw as a problem that’s “certainly instantiated in software code, but is also present on the design level.” Examples of flaws include error-handling problems and broken or illogical access control. Bugs and flaws create risks, which are the probability that a flaw or a bug will impact the software’s purpose: risk = probability × impact. Software defects might exist for a long time before attackers actually exploit them.

Networking applications—especially those exposed to the Internet—are much more vulnerable to threats than conventional stand-alone desktop applications as many more users can access them, and access is much harder to control. Often, attacks over the Internet are almost fully automated, and many tools let people with even minor technical knowledge (known as “script kiddies”) exploit vulnerabilities.

**Key Vulnerabilities**

As a Web application, a WCMS is an attractive target for attackers and a major source of security vulnerabilities. Threats affect one or more security aspects. According to several experts, Web application threats include

- **Data manipulation.** This type of attack violates data integrity, and the resulting data loss or perversion can have serious consequences. Common attack techniques here include parameter manipulation and SQL injection.
- **Accessing confidential data.** Here, attackers access off-the-record data using techniques such as structured Query Language (SQL) injection and cross-site scripting (XSS).
- **Phishing.** This attack gathers confidential data—such as bank account information, social security numbers, or passwords—by contacting users under false pretenses via email and luring them to Web sites where they’re encouraged to enter personal data. For example, attackers might use XSS to gather user data by placing manipulated input forms on pages managed by a WCMS. They can also exploit WCMS vulnerabilities to lure users to replicated Web sites that mimic an official site, such as a bank, and gather data accordingly.
- **Code execution.** Attackers can exploit WCMS vulnerabilities to load files or programs containing defective code onto a Web server. They can do this by using even simple graphic files. The WCMS must carefully verify inputs because such an attack can harm not only the WCMS itself, but also other applications on the same server.
- **Spam.** Here, Web crawlers scan the Internet for valid email addresses and send spam accordingly. Attackers can also use an application vulnerability to send spam through the application’s server, turning it into a spam relay server.

As these examples show—and Michael Howard and David LeBlanc note—Web applications in general, and WCMSs in particular, operate in a hostile environment.

**Attacks and Countermeasures**

Attackers use various attack patterns, which are blueprints for creating a particular type of attack. Each attack consists of several phases of discovery and exploitation; the pattern generalizes the steps so that other malicious users can successfully attack the application. Attack patterns can include many dimensions, such as timing, resources required, and techniques.

Because of a WCMS’s wide application area, the possible harm due to attacks is manifold. If a WCMS is used as an e-commerce site, attackers might obtain confidential customer data, such as credit-card information. If the site’s owner had failed to properly secure the WCMS, an attack disclosure could lead to claims for damages, as well as a general loss of customer confidence.

In other cases, attackers might gather user information, such as addresses and profiles, and sell the information to the site’s competitors. A WCMS can also be sabotaged and rendered inaccessible. This could, for example, lead to a decline in sales.

On corporate WCMS Web sites, attackers might utilize security leaks to upload malicious code and harm a company’s IT infrastructure. Attackers might also alter the company’s Web site content by, for example, adding dubious and suspect content to tarnish the company’s reputation.

To be considered secure, a Web application must ensure

- authentication, by verifying that entities or people are who they pretend to be;
- confidentiality, by hiding information from unau-
Authorized people;
• integrity, by preventing unauthorized people from modifying, withholding, and deleting information; and
• availability, by performing operations according to their purpose over time.11

To achieve these goals, application developers can use several mechanisms, including sophisticated authentication, user access control, and mechanisms that determine when to maintain data confidentiality, such as when not to show credit-card numbers when verifying a person's financial state.

Security Analysis: Open Source WCMS
As the sidebar, “Open vs. Closed Source Security” notes, an open source system's primary attractions give rise to its vulnerabilities: its low cost and source code availability make it readily accessible to attackers seeking to locate and exploit application weaknesses. Still, open source WCMSs are widely available and widely used.

Figure 1 shows an overview of technologies and corresponding WCMSs. Most systems are developed in PHP, Java, Perl, or Python. As the ellipses indicate, all systems—indeed of their implementation—use Web standards such as HTML, XML, and CSS and relational databases such as MySQL.

It’s difficult to determine the exact number of sites powered by a specific WCMS. Various sources try to estimate such numbers using different metrics.12 For our case study, we chose Joomla (www.joomla.org) and Drupal (www.drupal.org)—two open source systems that create complex Web content. These are among the most widely used systems according to such estimates. Additionally, UK Linux World named Joomla the Best Linux/Open Source Project in 2006 (www.joomla.org/announcements/general-news/2165-joomla-wins-again-at-uk-linuxworld.html). That same year, Joomla also won Packt Publishing's Open Source CMS Award, and Drupal took second place (see www.packtpub.com/article/open-source-content-management-system-award-winner-announced).

Joomla and Drupal have many similarities. They both use LAMP—that is, Linux, Apache, MySQL, and PHP. They both also use XML files to store configuration parameters and CSS for design and layout, and have similar functionality. Nonetheless, Joomla and Drupal have key differences that make them interesting from a security-comparison perspective, including different architectures and implementations.

Joomla
Joomla is a derivative of Mambo, a popular PHP-based WCMS, and has been used to build roughly 5 million Web sites worldwide. The system emphasizes ease of use, so even nontechnical users can create, edit, and maintain content. Joomla also offers many out-of-the-box Web site components, including forums and chat components, calendars, and blogging software. Joomla is easily customized for special needs and is in use on everything from private and small business Web sites to corporate portals.

Joomla developers are organized in a core team that’s responsible for overall project management, and several working groups that handle particular issues, such as development, documentation, or translation. Joomla developers estimate that there are more than 140,000 active registered users on the Official Joomla community forum (http://demo.joomla.org/1.5/more-about-joomla/30-the-community/21-joomla-facts.html).

The Joomla forum comprises a security section in which users discuss security issues and submit possible vulnerabilities (http://forum.joomla.org/viewforum.php?f=432). This section also contains guidelines, tutorials, and hints for increasing security and mitigating risks. Security issues are categorized according to level (low, medium, or high) and are fixed in minor releases or by patches.

Drupal
Dutch students developed Drupal in what was originally an effort to implement a collaboration platform. Today, Drupal is used for numerous private and university Web sites, as well as for collaboration portals and e-commerce sites. DrupalSites.net, for example, lists several thousand Web sites powered by Drupal (www.drupalsites.net). Like Joomla, Drupal offers many additional modules, including newsletters and podcasting components.
Drupal developers have their own security team (http://drupal.org/security-team) that’s responsible for accepting and evaluating security-related warnings, searching for vulnerabilities in the core application, and supporting module developers in fulfilling security requirements. In recognition of security’s importance, the Drupal Web site has a dedicated section to inform users about current vulnerabilities and appropriate patches.

**Analysis Overview**

For our analysis, we used Drupal 5.2 and Joomla 1.0.13. As of this writing, newer versions of both systems are available. However, our goal hasn’t been to list a specific version’s vulnerabilities, but rather to give a sense of the systems’ security status and whether users can trust this security without further ado. Hopefully, both organizations will constantly release newer versions that fix known security problems. Indeed, updates to both applications fix some of the vulnerabilities we now describe, further confirming our analysis results. However, new versions can also introduce new problems, and attackers might find additional security holes.

We carried out our security analysis in several steps. First, we installed both systems and evaluated how different configuration settings—such as deactivating the PHP `safe_mode` setting—might influence security issues. Second, we performed simple penetration tests by sending various malicious input. We were aided here by several simple tools—including WebScarab (www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WebScarab_Project) and TamperData (http://tamperdata.mozdev.org)—that let us perform simple security tests by manipulating parameters sent to Web servers, such as modifying data in HTTP request headers. As we describe later, we sent simple requests that could lead to XSS or SQL injection.

In our third step, we inspected the source code files of both Joomla and Drupal for additional problem areas. Both systems had almost 2,000 source files, which we searched for security-related strings. For example, `$_SERVER` indicates an access to the Web server’s global variables, which might contain input from the Web client. The variables might also include hazardous input from malicious users. So, for our analysis, we simply reviewed the code to see whether the developers had taken appropriate measures before they used the variables’ content. We also used the source files to understand and evaluate the systems’ general security mechanisms, such as authentication or user session management.

In step 4, we used the knowledge gained in step 3 to send additional and more focused malicious requests. Finally, we evaluated community support for security issues by simply browsing the Joomla and Drupal Web sites and by checking for specific community activities, including security forums, FAQs, and checklists.

Finally, although it’s possible to assess WCMS security using special penetration testing tools, we refrained from using commercial tools. However, we might consider using license-free tools—such as those for source code analysis—in future evaluations.

**Analysis Results**

We evaluated the two systems according to specific security categories and criteria. Table 1 offers a summary of the results.

**Community**

On the Internet, change happens quickly; knowledge about vulnerabilities also spreads quickly. It’s thus necessary to rapidly respond to vulnerabilities and provide patches to prohibit their exploitation once they’re publicly known. Development communities must be dedicated to providing both a secure system and information for their users on how to further ensure system security. Communities should also define processes for reporting vulnerabilities and tracking their status.

Both the Joomla and Drupal communities are
Table 1. Security analysis results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JOOMLA</th>
<th>DRUPAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vulnerability reporting</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hints on countermeasures</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTALLATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security hints</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security settings</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAMETER MANIPULATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTTP header data</td>
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<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super global arrays</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cookies</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Command Execution</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms</td>
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<td>○</td>
</tr>
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<td>CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING (XSS)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>XSS via search fields</td>
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<tr>
<td>XSS in other forms</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>XSS in back end</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Any countermeasures</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<td>Secure passwords</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sessions at the server</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sessions at the client</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session hijacking</td>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to functions</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAM</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Contact forms</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<td>Spam relays</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<td>Email addresses</td>
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<td>○</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALICIOUS FILE UPLOAD</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checking file contents</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEVATION OF PRIVILEGE</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Privileged users</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTIONAL MODULES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warnings</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security measures in core</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

○: Security requirement fulfilled
●: Security requirement partially fulfilled; potential security risk
■: Security requirement isn’t fulfilled; definite security risk

Both systems’ communities pay adequate attention to security aspects, systematically tracking vulnerabilities and providing patches with security fixes.

Installation

Because many WCMS users are nonexperts, it’s important that the installation process be as automated as possible. WCMSs have many configuration settings that might open or close specific vulnerabilities; if users choose the default settings, the system should be secure:

- **Security hints.** Joomla provides a pre-installation check and warns users of suboptimal security settings. Drupal has a simpler installation process that doesn’t provide security issue hints.
- **Security settings.** Once installation is complete, neither system offers sufficient support for modifying the security settings. However, the settings’ primary focus is to guarantee a trouble-free collaboration with third-party modules.

It’s important that users are alerted to security issues during installation and that they can easily modify security settings thereafter. Here, both systems have ample space for improvements.

Parameter Manipulation

Parameter manipulation includes the ability to alter super global variables, cookie poisoning, remote command execution, and Web form data manipulation as follows:

- **HTTP header data.** If an Internet application doesn’t check for valid HTTP header data, manipulated data can result in multiple answers to a single request. Thus, a proxy or cache server might send manipulated answers to clients.
- **Super global variables.** In PHP applications, super global variables contain information set by the Web
server or otherwise directly related to the execution environment. Attackers can manipulate these variables to carry out SQL injection or XSS. Therefore, the system must check these variables before processing them.

*Cookie poisoning.* Cookies typically store user-related data—such as shopping cart items—on a user’s local computer. However, attackers can poison cookies by altering their contents during transmission to the server. Therefore, a WCMS must not blindly trust cookie data.

*Remote command execution.* Attackers can execute remote commands on the WCMS by including malicious PHP scripts stored on the computers they’re operating. To achieve this, attackers must manipulate parameters such that the PHP operations are called with the malicious script’s URL. Thus, the system must check parameters if their content can lead to the execution of operations such as `include()` or `require()`.

*Web form data.* Web forms contain various ways of transferring data from the user to a server. It’s rather easy to manipulate this data and send dangerous contents to a server.

Although Joomla and Drupal are quite prepared for parameter manipulation, they’re not without deficiencies: neither system sufficiently filters HTTP headers and Web form data. Drupal, for example, stores all transmitted data unfiltered in an underlying database table. Consequently, the security system checks only the database query results.

**Cross-Site Scripting**

Attackers can manipulate Web servers’ input data to contain script code, such as JavaScript. If the server sends this input to other clients without appropriate checks, the client side executes the script code. Thus, XSS isn’t dangerous to the server itself, but to its clients. Take, for example, the input `<script>alert(“hacker alert”)</script>`. If attackers input this text with HTML escape codes or encode it in hexadecimal numbers, servers would find it much more difficult to recognize. Both Joomla and Drupal properly secure the login mechanism and session data. However, both also contain weaknesses related to password security and unauthorized access to functions.

**SQL Injection**

SQL injection reads or alters database contents through user input, which must be checked for SQL commands to avoid danger. Typically, attackers use Web form input to create database queries in SQL. Malicious users might input parts of SQL commands and thus alter the meaning of the WCMS’s SQL commands. For example, a malicious user might append OR ‘1’=’1’ in a Web form field. If the WCMS uses this input to create a SELECT or DELETE statement, it could lead to unwanted data disclosure and manipulation. The Boolean expression OR ‘1’=’1’ always yields true and will therefore successfully execute the SQL statement independent of the other parameters. As an example, if a user enters John Doe as his name, the following SQL statement will deliver information about him:

```sql
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ‘John Doe’;
```

If a malicious user alters the name and enters John Doe’ OR ‘1’=’1 instead, the following SQL query will be used:

```sql
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ‘John Doe’ OR ‘1’=’1’;
```

This statement will provide information about all users. Both Joomla and Drupal perform checks to prevent SQL injection. Drupal offers a function `db_query()` that can and should be called before sending SQL queries. Joomla uses PHP’s `mysql_escape_string()` function, which masks all kinds of special characters.

**Authentication**

When using a secure system, users first encounter the login mechanism, which is sometimes vulnerable to XSS or SQL injection. Insecure passwords can also grant access to unauthorized users. Also, session hijacking can occur if the system uses insecure connections to transfer authorization data. Last but not least, systems must make authorization checks not only during login but also when users access specific functions; a regular user, for example, shouldn’t be allowed to call administration functions.

On the client side, both Joomla and Drupal properly secure the login mechanism and session data. However, both also contain weaknesses related to password security and unauthorized access to functions.

**Spam**

Some attackers employ tools that use email forms to send messages to third parties, with the server acting as a spam relay. One way to reduce spam is to use a CAPTCHA, an acronym for a completely automated public Turing test to tell computers and humans apart. Also, systems shouldn’t present email addresses in a form readable by automated tools—such as spambots—which can use them as spam targets.

Joomla addresses all aspects of spam; Drupal has yet to make a full effort and publishes email addresses plainly.

**Malicious File Upload**

Copying files to a Web server is inherently dangerous because attackers can camouflage file contents; a file
name ending with “.jpg” doesn’t necessarily contain an image. Systems must check any contents transferred to a server.

Both Joomla and Drupal lack sufficient mechanisms to prevent malicious content upload. For example, in both systems, attackers can upload malicious data hidden as a file because both systems validate file type, but not content, and would thus simply treat a “.jpg” file as an image.

Privilege Elevation
The more privileged a user, the more severe the attack he or she can perform. This is because highly privileged users can access system parts that let them transfer various content types—such as text strings—that can hide malicious code. They can use HTML code, such as a simple image tag, to transmit JavaScript. Thus, if someone fraudulently obtains access to a less privileged user account, it can be a first step toward intruding to a more highly privileged account.

Joomla provides a TinyMCE editor that validates user input on the client computer. It’s therefore easy for attackers to bypass the check and transmit any kind of script code to the server to launch attacks such as XSS. Because Drupal filters all textual contents before they’re sent to the client, it makes it more difficult for attackers to violate data integrity. However, Drupal lets attackers upload PHP code that’s interpreted on the server without further checks in case an administrator carelessly changes some configuration settings.

Optional Modules
Although they increase functionality, optional modules can also compromise the entire system’s security. It’s therefore important both to warn users about potentially insecure modules and to provide core system mechanisms that prevent additional modules from compromising security.

Both Joomla and Drupal offer warnings that should keep users from adding questionable modules.

Results Summary
Figure 2 summarizes possible WCMS attacks, which might be directed at a target object, such as third-party users in a spam attack, or at the database, where SQL injection might lead to confidential data disclosure.

Table 1 summarizes our security analysis results. Although Joomla and Drupal provide extensive security mechanisms, there’s ample opportunity for inexperienced and experienced users to open the doors for malicious code. Both systems are supported by security-aware communities, and we expect their security levels to increase in the future. Still, we can’t recommend unwary use of these systems.

Although eliminating the vulnerabilities in Joomla and Drupal isn’t difficult given some expert knowledge, the systems are targeted to a nonexpert audience. Consequently, many systems out there have vulnerabilities that attackers can easily exploit. Such systems might not (yet) be attractive enough to actually attract attacks. However, it’s our task to both be ahead of attackers in securing high-risk applications and also to provide basic security for small- and medium-sized companies. Given this, can we recommend using WCMSs like Joomla or Drupal? And what can nontechnical users do to minimize threats if they do?

Using these systems is a viable option, but users must take precautions. Above all, nontechnical users should always use the latest available version. Technically skilled users can stick to older versions, but they must be familiar with their version’s security status and regularly visit the WCMS’s Web site for vulnerability and countermeasure updates. Also, when installing a WCMS, users should carefully set configuration settings with security in mind, and nontechnical users should follow the community’s recommendations.

The same precautions hold when installing optional modules, which might themselves contain vulnerabilities. Finally, when deciding on which WCMS to use, we recommend that each community’s security efforts be a key criterion.

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Figure 2. Potential Web content management systems attacks. Attacks might be aimed at a target object, such as a third-party user, or at the database, as in the case of SQL injection.


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